Ransomware Resilience Validation
Whether ransomware could halt your operations and block recovery
We turn a vague worry about ransomware into a clear answer: where to cut the path, and in what order.
From the way in, through spreading inside and admin rights, to backup and recovery, we look across the paths that lead to the harm.
If ransomware got in, is there a path in our environment that would halt operations and block recovery?
For each stage: whether it was stopped or got through, the evidence, and how much of the business would stop.
Expert reviewed
When it fits
- Downtime would cost you dearly
Manufacturing, logistics, healthcare, retail: places where production, deliveries, care or sales stop when the systems do.
- Backup and recovery are new or have changed
Find out, before you ever need them, whether new backups could be wiped or locked along with production.
- Others in your sector have been hit
If news of a similar company brought to a halt has someone asking ‘are we all right?’, we start by checking whether the same path exists in your environment.
- An insurer or a customer asks about your ransomware readiness
When a cyber-insurance application or renewal, or a customer's supply-chain review, asks how prepared you are for ransomware, you want to answer with paths and conditions you have actually checked.
The SAFE SQUARE approach
What must not stop comes first
We start from the operations that must not stop and the data you must get back, and follow in depth the paths that lead to losing them.
Each stage, confirmed
We check whether the access and rights each stage needs can actually be obtained, and keep the confirmed facts and evidence for every path.
Blocking and noticing, together
At each stage we record whether it was stopped and which logs and alerts could have shown it, and choose where to cut from both.
What we look at
Every environment has its own paths to harm; below are places we often check at each stage.
- ENTRYThe way in
- Remote access points open to the outside, such as VPNs
- Servers, services and admin pages exposed to the internet
- Accounts that have leaked or lack multi-factor authentication
- Connections from partners and maintenance contractors
- SPREADSpread and privileges
- Ways from user PCs to the servers
- How well admin accounts and identity servers (such as AD) are protected
- Separation of network zones and limits on moving between them
- BACKUPBackup and recovery
- Whether the backups can be reached with the same rights as production
- Copies kept apart, and settings that stop backups being deleted or changed
- Whether the systems recovery depends on, such as identity and backup servers, would stop too
- IMPACTDetection and impact
- Where an intrusion or its spread could be noticed
- How far a disruption would reach, and how business systems depend on each other
- The systems and data to bring back first
‘Backups cannot be deleted with the same admin rights as production’
‘No single user PC leads straight to the core business servers’
‘Losing one admin account does not lock every server at once’
How it runs
Decide what must not stop
We identify the operations and systems that would cost most if they stopped and the data that must be recoverable, and set the conditions that must hold.
Agree scope and safety
Together we agree the scope, the target systems and what we may do.
Validate paths and conditions
Stage by stage, we check whether each condition holds and where it could be noticed.
Show where to cut
For each path: the conditions that held, the impact on operations, where to cut it first and how to improve.
In the live environment we go only as far as confirming that each stage's access and rights can be obtained; encryption and deletion are reproduced on test data. The principles every engagement follows, safe conduct and stop conditions, facts kept apart from assumptions, and how material is kept and destroyed, are set out under How we work.
What you receive
Results by path
For each path: the stage at which it was stopped, or how far it carried on, with the conditions that make it so.
How far a disruption would reach
If the conditions held, which operations would stop and what would be hard to recover.
Where to cut, and in what order
Where the paths can be cut, and what to address first.
Evidence you can reproduce
Proof that lets what we found be reproduced, so that after the fix the same check can be run again.
If the clinical and booking systems stop, they can be restored from backup
Target: a hospital's office network, clinical and booking servers, file server and backup store
| Stage | Result | Evidence |
|---|---|---|
| Way in: an email attachment | Got through | An attachment carrying a macro ran on a staff PC as it was; the mail filter let it through. |
| Spread: the file server's shared folders | Got through | Shared folders that every member of staff can write to are mapped on every PC, so one PC can change everything on the file server. |
| Admin rights: the server administrator accounts | Stopped | Server administrator accounts are separate from the PC accounts and need multi-factor authentication, so rights gained on a PC do not reach the clinical and booking servers. |
| Backups: the ‘offline’ backup store | Got through | The store classed as offline is in fact a network share that is always connected, and the backup software's service account is also used on the file server, so that account can delete the backups. |
| Noticing: files changed in bulk | Needs work | Bulk changes on the file server are logged but raise no alert, so encryption could begin and go unnoticed until the next clinic session. |
- Impact on operations
- One attachment run on one PC could lock the clinical records on the file server and the backups together: booking and care stop, and recovery is slow.
- Where to cut first
- First, take the backup store off the network share and connect it only at set times, and give the backup software a service account of its own. Then narrow write access on the shared folders by department, and turn the bulk-change log into an alert.
This validation records where an attack could be noticed, and evaluates blocking and recovery. Whether your organisation as a whole notices and responds is the question for Objective-Based Penetration Testing & Red Teaming.