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Ransomware Resilience Validation

Whether ransomware could halt your operations and block recovery

We turn a vague worry about ransomware into a clear answer: where to cut the path, and in what order.

From the way in, through spreading inside and admin rights, to backup and recovery, we look across the paths that lead to the harm.

If ransomware got in, is there a path in our environment that would halt operations and block recovery?

For each stage: whether it was stopped or got through, the evidence, and how much of the business would stop.

Expert reviewed

ENTRY Way in SPREAD Spread inside ADMIN Admin rights BACKUP Backup & recovery Operations halted, no recovery Where the path can be cut Path that reached the harm
A path that comes in from outside, spreads inside and gains admin rights can halt operations and block recovery if those same rights reach the backups.

When it fits

  • Downtime would cost you dearly

    Manufacturing, logistics, healthcare, retail: places where production, deliveries, care or sales stop when the systems do.

  • Backup and recovery are new or have changed

    Find out, before you ever need them, whether new backups could be wiped or locked along with production.

  • Others in your sector have been hit

    If news of a similar company brought to a halt has someone asking ‘are we all right?’, we start by checking whether the same path exists in your environment.

  • An insurer or a customer asks about your ransomware readiness

    When a cyber-insurance application or renewal, or a customer's supply-chain review, asks how prepared you are for ransomware, you want to answer with paths and conditions you have actually checked.

The SAFE SQUARE approach

What must not stop comes first

We start from the operations that must not stop and the data you must get back, and follow in depth the paths that lead to losing them.

Each stage, confirmed

We check whether the access and rights each stage needs can actually be obtained, and keep the confirmed facts and evidence for every path.

Blocking and noticing, together

At each stage we record whether it was stopped and which logs and alerts could have shown it, and choose where to cut from both.

What we look at

Every environment has its own paths to harm; below are places we often check at each stage.

  • ENTRYThe way in
    • Remote access points open to the outside, such as VPNs
    • Servers, services and admin pages exposed to the internet
    • Accounts that have leaked or lack multi-factor authentication
    • Connections from partners and maintenance contractors
  • SPREADSpread and privileges
    • Ways from user PCs to the servers
    • How well admin accounts and identity servers (such as AD) are protected
    • Separation of network zones and limits on moving between them
  • BACKUPBackup and recovery
    • Whether the backups can be reached with the same rights as production
    • Copies kept apart, and settings that stop backups being deleted or changed
    • Whether the systems recovery depends on, such as identity and backup servers, would stop too
  • IMPACTDetection and impact
    • Where an intrusion or its spread could be noticed
    • How far a disruption would reach, and how business systems depend on each other
    • The systems and data to bring back first
Conditions we might test

‘Backups cannot be deleted with the same admin rights as production’
‘No single user PC leads straight to the core business servers’
‘Losing one admin account does not lock every server at once’

How it runs

  1. Decide what must not stop

    We identify the operations and systems that would cost most if they stopped and the data that must be recoverable, and set the conditions that must hold.

  2. Agree scope and safety

    Together we agree the scope, the target systems and what we may do.

  3. Validate paths and conditions

    Stage by stage, we check whether each condition holds and where it could be noticed.

  4. Show where to cut

    For each path: the conditions that held, the impact on operations, where to cut it first and how to improve.

In the live environment we go only as far as confirming that each stage's access and rights can be obtained; encryption and deletion are reproduced on test data. The principles every engagement follows, safe conduct and stop conditions, facts kept apart from assumptions, and how material is kept and destroyed, are set out under How we work.

What you receive

Results by path

For each path: the stage at which it was stopped, or how far it carried on, with the conditions that make it so.

How far a disruption would reach

If the conditions held, which operations would stop and what would be hard to recover.

Where to cut, and in what order

Where the paths can be cut, and what to address first.

Evidence you can reproduce

Proof that lets what we found be reproduced, so that after the fix the same check can be run again.

A sample validation resultFictional example
Condition

If the clinical and booking systems stop, they can be restored from backup

Target: a hospital's office network, clinical and booking servers, file server and backup store

StageResultEvidence
Way in: an email attachmentGot throughAn attachment carrying a macro ran on a staff PC as it was; the mail filter let it through.
Spread: the file server's shared foldersGot throughShared folders that every member of staff can write to are mapped on every PC, so one PC can change everything on the file server.
Admin rights: the server administrator accountsStoppedServer administrator accounts are separate from the PC accounts and need multi-factor authentication, so rights gained on a PC do not reach the clinical and booking servers.
Backups: the ‘offline’ backup storeGot throughThe store classed as offline is in fact a network share that is always connected, and the backup software's service account is also used on the file server, so that account can delete the backups.
Noticing: files changed in bulkNeeds workBulk changes on the file server are logged but raise no alert, so encryption could begin and go unnoticed until the next clinic session.
Impact on operations
One attachment run on one PC could lock the clinical records on the file server and the backups together: booking and care stop, and recovery is slow.
Where to cut first
First, take the backup store off the network share and connect it only at set times, and give the backup software a service account of its own. Then narrow write access on the shared folders by department, and turn the bulk-change log into an alert.

This validation records where an attack could be noticed, and evaluates blocking and recovery. Whether your organisation as a whole notices and responds is the question for Objective-Based Penetration Testing & Red Teaming.

  1. Tell us what worries you, or what you want checked. A few lines are enough.

  2. We reply with a proposed scope, schedule and cost, and settle them with you.

  3. Once agreed, the work begins. Results and next steps come to you as it runs.